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The Costs of Tragedy: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Theories of Justice
Ethicist Martha Nussbaum Speaks at CWRU
I
t is not uncommon for many of those who are 
involved with ethics in some way to proclaim 
that Martha Nussbaum has changed the way 
that many people think about the subject. Lucky 
for those people at CWRU, she was the final 
speaker at the 2000 Baker-Nord Center for the 
Humanities traditional “Humanities Week, ” on 
September 20.
The Baker Nord-Center facilitates and encourages 
collaborative work among faculty and students in 
the humanities and performing arts (Art History, 
Classics, English, History, Modem Languages, 
Music, Philosophy, Religion, Theater and Dance) 
with colleagues in the sciences and social sciences, 
and through joint programs with other University 
Circle institutions. It sponsors conferences, semi­
nars, lectures, research and special events that 
enhance the presence and visibility of the humani­
ties at CWRU. The Baker-Nord Center for the 
Humanities was funded in 1996 by an endowment 
gift from Eric and Jane Nord. It is directed by Dr. 
Tom Bishop, Associate Professor of English. Dr. 
Catherine Scallen, Associate Professor of Art 
History, serves as Associate Director.
Director^orner: 
Tragict5i<resions
Ms. Nussbaum’s speech, “The Costs of Tragedy: 
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Theories of Justice” was 
presented in the 1912 Room in Thwing Center on 
CWRU’s campus.
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“It’s a pleasure to be here, especially during Hu­
manities Week,” she said. “Recently, I have been 
trying to explain to law, public policy and develop­
ment people why the humanities are important to 
what they do,” Nussbaum began. Her talk grew
out of a project she had been doing about cost 
benefit analysis. “Cost-benefit analysis is a 
technique that effects all of our lives, all of the 
time. It is important to see what might be the 
short comings of cost-benefit analysis, and how 
we can see those short comings by thinking 
about stories from ancient tragedies.”
As her first example, she used the ancient epic 
poem from India titled The Mahabharata.
“Arjuna stands at the head of his troops. A huge 
battle is about to begin. On his side are the 
Pandavas, the royal family headed by Arjuna’s 
eldest brother and legitimate heir to the throne. 
On the other side are his cousins, who have 
usurped power,” she explained. “More or less 
everyone has joined one side or the other. Arjuna 
sees that many on the enemy’s side are blameless 
people for whom he has great affection. In the 
ensuing battle, he will have to kill as many of 
them as possible. How can it be right to embark 
on a course that will bring death to so many 
relations and friends? How, on the other hand, 
could it possibly be right to abandon one’s own 
side and one’s family in doing thatf”
Here, she quoted the poem directly:
“Arjuna saw his closest kinsman related to him 
as father or grandfather, uncle or brother, son or 
grandson, as well as companion and friend, on 
both sides. Overcome by this sight he said in 
sorrow and compassion. ‘Oh Krishna, when I 
see my own people ready to fight and eager for 
battle my limbs shudder and my mouth is dry my 
body shivers, my hair stands on end. Eurther-
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more, I see evil portents, and I can see no good in 
killing my own kinsman. It is not right and proper 
that we not kill our own kin and kinsman. How can 
we be happy if we slay our own people? Oh Krishna, 
how can I strike with my arrows people who are 
worthy of my respect?’ Having said these words 
Arjuna threw away his bow and arrows and sat down 
sorrowfully...”
Inherent in Arjuna’s distress are two questions. “The 
first question I am calling the obvious question and it 
is, ‘What he ought to do?’ That question may be very 
difficult to answer and, as well, it may be difficult to 
identify the best method of arriving at the answer,” 
she explained. “What is not difficult, however, is to 
see it is a question that has to be answered since some 
action must be taken. In such a situation, even 
inaction is a kind of action. In that sense, the ques­
tion is obvious — it is just forced by the situation. 
Arjuna cannot be both a loyal, dutiful leader of his 
family and, at the same time, a preserver of lives of 
his friends and relations on the other side. He has to 
choose.”
According to Professor Nussbaum, the second 
question is not obvious and is not forced by the 
situation. Most importantly, it is a question that might 
have easily eluded Arjuna. “I shall call this question: 
‘the tragic question,’ ” she said.
The tragic question rears its head when there is a 
chance none of the alternatives available to someone 
are morally acceptable. “Arjuna feels that this ques­
tion must be faced and when it is faced, its answer is 
‘no,’ ” she explained. “Krishna, by contrast, either 
fails to see the force of that question all together or 
recommends a policy of deliberately not facing it in 
order to better get on with his duty. The tragic 
question is not simply a way of expressing the fact 
that is very difficult to answer the obvious question 
— difficulty of choice is quite independent of the 
presence of serious moral wrong on both sides of the 
choice. In fact, in this case, as in many tragic dilem­
mas, it’s rather dear what Arjuna ought to do, much 
though he’s tempted to throw away his arrows (that 
would, of course, ultimately accomplish nothing — 
resulting simply in the deaths of many more on his 
own side and possibly the loss of their ‘just cause’ 
while countless lives will stiU be lost on the other 
side).” It is obvious that Arjuna must fight.
“In non-tragic cases, the obvious question may 
frequently be very difficult when two or more non- 
tragic alternatives are equally balanced. The tragic 
question registers, not for difficulty of solving the 
obvious question, but for distinct difficulty — the 
fact that all available answers to the obvious question 
including the best one are bad,” she said. Bad, in this 
case, as in many others, is defined as “involving 
serious moral wrong doing.”
So how does Arjuna determine that the answer to the 
tragic question is “no?”
“Arjuna appears to consult an independent account of 
ethical value according to which murdering one’s own 
family members, especially when they have done no 
wrong, is a heinous, moral violation,” explained 
Professor Nussbaum. These values include a huge 
list of items including: respect, kinship and the right. 
“But deserting one’s family when one is their leader 
and essential supporter is also morally wrong. Ethical 
thoughts independent of the ‘what to do?’ question 
enter in to inform him that his predicament is not just 
tough, but also tragic,” she said.
With that. Professor Nussbaum got to the heart of 
her talk, explaining that she would be aiguing how 
important the tragic question is for everyone, espe­
cially when we evaluate our choices, but most impor­
tantly in situations of public choice. “I will argue 
that while cost-benefit analysis offers an attractive way 
of approaching the obvious question, it offers no 
good way at all of registering the force of the tragic 
question or even of representing the situation in 
which the answer to that question is no,” she said.
“Too much reliance on cost benefit analysis as a 
general method of public choice can distract us from 
an issue of major importance.” She reminded us that 
many are skilled at making us believe that we have 
only one question when, in fact, we have two.
“When we think of our two situations of choice that 
I have just described, it might seem that the real 
question is the obvious question and the tragic 
question is just a useless distraction,” she continued. 
Apparently Krishna thinks similarly as seen in the 
next quotation of theMahabharata:
“ ‘Oh, Arjuna,’ says Krishna, ‘why have you become 
depressed this critical hour? Such dejection is 
unknown to noble men It does not lead to the
The tragic question is not simply a way of 
expressing the fact that it is very difficult 
to answer the obvious question — 
difficulty of choice is quite independent 
of the presence of serious moral wrong 
on both sides of the choice.
heavenly heights and on earth it can only cause 
disgrace....’ ”
Undoubtedly, there are many people who think that 
Krishna is right. “When one sees where one’s duty 
lies, one should simply get on with it without tragic 
hand-wringing and moaning. We don’t want military 
leaders who self indulgently wring their hands about 
the blood they are about to shed, or who throw away 
their arrows and sit sorrowfully. It does no good for 
them to think this way and it may well do harm to 
their troops,” she said. “On the other hand, I think it 
is possible to argue that Arjuna, who sees the tragic 
question, is a better model of deliberation here than 
Krishna, who does not.” An important point to 
Arjuna’s tragic question is that the tragedy could have 
been avoided by better political planning. According 
to Nussbaum, this keeps the mind of the chooser (in 
this case, Arjuna) firmly on the fact that his action is 
an immoral action that it is always wrong to choose, 
albeit under duress.
“The recognition that one is going to have dirty hands 
is not just self-indulgence,” she said. “It has great 
significance for future actions. It informs the 
chooser, for example, that he is going to owe repara­
tions to the vanquished and an effort to rebuild their 
lives after the disaster has been inflicted upon them,” 
she said. “Most significantly, it reminds the chooser 
that he must not do such things henceforth except in
the very special and limited circumstances, like the 
ones he faces right here.”
It is vital that people are reminded of the tragic 
question during war for it can reinforce morality that 
should be reinforced in this difficult time. Terrible 
things occur when the tragic question is not ad­
dressed. For example, in war, people could take the 
infliction of damage on civilians too lightly. “When I 
talked about this topic a few years back at West Point, 
the officers and the cadets were very keen on the idea 
of keeping this particular question in mind as they 
were worried about the atrocities committed during 
the Vietnam War,” she said.
According to Professor Nussbaum, many moral 
philosophers have insisted that tragic conflicts are 
conflicts only of what they callprima facie obligations. 
“That is to say, obligations that are preliminary, but 
not final and there can be only one right choice, and 
once the choice is arrived at, the conflicting obligation 
simply drops away,” she explained. “I think the 
difficulty with this idea is that it makes morality the 
handmaiden of fortune. The sheer fact that obliga­
tion ‘a’ conflicts with obligation ‘b’ brings about that 
‘a’ or ‘b’ is no longer binding. This allows people to 
wiggle out of commitments that should be regarded 
as binding.” For example, someone like Arjuna, who 
knows killing his kin wrong should not change his 
mind because of a certain event. “Such a picture of 3
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morality yields an unacceptable picture,” she added.
Next, Professor Nussbaum asks us to consider 
Antigone, Sophocles’s play. “Creon, the ruler, tells the 
whole city that anyone who offers burial to 
Polyneices, the traitor, is him/herself a traitor to the 
city and will be put to death,” she began. “Antigone 
cannot accept this edict because it asks her to violate 
a fundamental, religious obligation - to seek burial for 
her kin. As the philospher Hegel correctly aigued: 
Each protagonist is too narrow, thinking of only one 
sphere of value and neglecting the claim of the 
other.” This means Creon thinks only of the city, 
neglecting the “laws” of family and obligation, and 
Antigone thinks only of the family and religion, not 
recognizing the crisis in the city.
“Each one has an impoverished conception, not only 
of moral value in general, but also of his or her 
cherished sphere of value. The character Haemon 
points out that Creon fails to recognize that these 
citizens are also members of families,” she said. “A 
protector of a city who neglects the values of family 
and religion is hardly protecting a city at all.
Antigone, on her side, fails to note that families need 
to live in cities in order to survive. A person who 
thought weO about Antigone’s choice offers up 
tragedy because both alternatives contain serious 
wrong doings or problems.” Because neither Creon 
nor Antigone see the tragedy inherent to the situation, 
both of these people are what Nussbaum calls 
“impoverished political actors.”
“This makes a huge difference for the political 
future,” she explained. “The drama depicts an 
extreme situation that is unlikely to occur very often. 
In this extreme situation there may be no avoiding a 
tragic clash of duties, but the character who faced the 
tragic question squarely would be prompted to have a 
group of highly useful thoughts about governments 
in general. In particular, it is important to see that the 
well being of the city and the unwritten laws of 
religious obligation are of central ethical importance.” 
Then this person could try to construct a city that 
makes room for everything. “Eor people to freely 
pursue their familial or religious obligations without 
running afoul of city ordinances,” she added. “He or 
she would want a city such as the Athenian leader 
Pericles claimed to find in democratic Athens when 
boasting about how the public policy in Athens shows 
respect for unwritten laws of religion.”
In America, do we have what Pericles boasted about 
in Athens? “We Americans believe that we can build 
a public order that builds in spaces for people’s free 
exercise of their religion,” said Professor Nussbaum. 
“We believe individuals are not always going to be 
tragically tom between civic ordinance and religious 
command.”
“Ancient Athens has analogous anti-tragic thought as 
a direct result, perhaps, of thinking of tragedies like 
Sophocles and Antigone,” she said. “It was here, 
indeed, that Hegel found plausibly the political 
significance of tragedy. Paraphrasing, he said: 
‘Tragedy reminds us of the deep importance of the 
spheres of life that come into conflict within the 
drama and of the dire results when they’re opposed, 
and we have to choose between them. It therefore 
motivates us to imagine what a world would be like 
that did not offer people such a world that has 
important action between two spheres of value. In 
that sense, the end of the drama is written offstage 
— by citizens who enact these insights in their own 
constmcted political reflection,’ ” she said.
However, Professor Nussbaum did say “Hegel’s 
approach to tragedy is a little too simple for it ignores 
the possibility that some degree of tragedy may be a 
stmctural feature of human life.” Human beings find 
themselves with a wide and differing array of values 
claiming attention and commitment. “The contingen­
cies of life make it almost inevitable that some 
disharmony will materialize among our many commit­
ments,” she explained. “The only way out of this 
disharmony would appear to lead a life so impover­
ished in value that it neglects many things human 
beings ought not to neglect.” A life like that will 
avoid tragedy? “Actually, it doesn’t really avoid 
tragedy — it just fails to see the tragedy involved in 
its own neglect of genuine values,” she said. “Hegel 
does give us the best strategy to follow, especially in 
political life. But we really do not know if the 
haimonious fostering of two, apparently opposed 
values, can be achieved until we try to bring that 
about.”
Many times, and in many places, there have been 
people who believe that coming to an understanding 
with religion and the state would be impossible. 
“Athens, Rome, modem liberal states — grappling
JAs well, we differ even more intensely about whether 
impediments to the publication of pornography are im­
possible burdens on the freedom of speech,” she said. 
“But all would agree that there Is some such class of 
morally central entitlements and that violating these is 
different in kind, not just in degree, than depriving some 
one of advantage or service. They agree that when 
there is an apparent conflict between two public goals, 
where one goal seems likely to be sacrificed the tragic
question must be asked.”
with the even thornier problem of the plurality of 
religions and of secular views - all, in their own ways, 
try to prove these people wrong,” she said. “To a 
great extent a political regime Hke ours (United States) 
enables citizens to avoid ^nftgone-like tragedies. That 
is what is meant by saying, as the Supreme Court said 
until very recently, that the state may not impose a 
substantial burden on an individual’s free exercise of 
religion without what they call a compelling state 
interest.”
But didn’t Creon have a compelling state interest’ 
“Won’t there be the chance that other people have 
issues similar to Creon’s?” Perhaps, but Professor 
Nussbaum does believe that we (in the U.S.) really do 
our best to keep tragedy at bay. “People are not going 
to be told that they can’t celebrate what their religion 
requires them to celebrate because of some civic laws. 
This is because we understand the course of the 
tragic question. To ask an individual to depart from a 
religious commitment is not just to impose an 
inconvenience; it is to ask something that goes to the 
heart of that person; it would deprive them of a 
sphere of liberty to which, as citizens, they have 
entitled to them, based on justice,” she explained.
She noted that Hegel’s idea of the tragic question 
could be seen even in a “true modem story with 
rather mundane content. In this story”, she explained, 
“given that the harms done are smaller, it will look
less tragic. But it still raises those similar Hegelian 
questions.”
As a new, assistant professor. Professor Nussbaum 
was dealing with the issue of working as well as being 
the sole caretaker of her young daughter. During the 
day posed no problem, because her daughter was in 
day care. However, her colleagues would insist on 
scheduling important and mandatory meetings in the 
evening or late afternoon, during which she had to 
pick up her daughter. She found herself facing her 
own tragic question. “Often, neither of the alterna­
tives looked fully, morally acceptable. Either I was 
deserting my duty to my colleagues or my daughter. 
The tragic question kept rearing its ugly head and 
frequently its answer was, ‘no, there is no fully 
acceptable course,” she remembered.
“This string of mini-tragedies was the result of 
obtuseness,” she told the group.
“The anangements my colleagues made were neither 
necessary nor sensible because it never dawned on 
them to think that a person ought to be able to be 
both a good primary parent and a good colleague,” 
she said. “They never bothered to think what very 
simple changes in schedule might be made to remove 
the problem. Nobody could talk about this, nobody 
could draw attention to it — certainly not the 
women.”
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Then during one of these evening lectures a male, 
tenured professor told the group he had to leave to 
pick up his son. “This,” explained Nussbaum, “was 
the first time there had been public acknowledgment 
there was a tension between two spheres of value and 
that we hadn’t been managing the tension very well. 
Whether or not this professor noticed he was in the 
middle of a tragic question remains to be seen. But 
when he spoke about this situation, he drew attention 
to the predicament of others who were more vulner­
able and who had similar family obligations.”
In our society there is a tendency to look at things like 
Professor Nussbaum’s now-resolved past string of 
mini-tragedies and say, “That’s just the way life is.”
But is it?
“Whenever we are inclined to say this about any clash 
of values, we should always pause and ask Hegel’s 
question - is there a rearrangement of our practices 
that can remove tragedy? In this case, it was easy. 
However, in many others, it may not be,” she said. 
Professor Nussbaum believes that examining child 
care, family leave and re-examining the career track 
would serve as useful starting points to finding the 
answer. “We need to examine alternatives because 
tragedy is rarely just tragedy. Most often behind the 
gloom is stupidity, selfishness or laziness,” she added.
Naturally, however, there are times when pausing too 
long over the tragic question is unnecessary. “For 
example,” she said, “you needn’t pause too long if it is 
obvious that at least one available course offers no 
serious wrongdoing.” But it is useful to at least pose 
the tragic question. “To do so just clarifies the danger 
of our ethical alternatives, informing us about impor­
tant differences between self-interest and commit­
ment, and reinforces commitments to important moral 
values that should be observed. It motivates us to 
make appropriate reparations for conduct. The 
recognition of tragedy leads us to ask how the tragic 
situation might have been avoided by better central 
planning,” she said. “And as such, all contemporary 
liberal democratic societies ask the tragic question at 
least implicitly.”
What this means is that these contemporary liberal 
democratic societies look for certain particular social 
goals and among those, pick out the ones that can 
offer the best things to the greatest nurrftier of people.
“These would be the things that everyone has a right 
to demand. Sometimes the venue of such protected 
areas value is relatively narrow, encompassing only 
first generation rights (i.e. civil liberties), and some­
times it is broader, taking in economic and social 
rights,” she explained. “All nations have some 
account, however lasting or disputed, of where the 
threshold falls in respect to each of these entitle­
ments. What kind of depravation of these rights is 
somewhat acceptable as to constitute a violation of a 
basic nonu? Usually we understand the importance 
of the rights in moral terms, i.e., for these citizens to 
lack these freedoms would be morally bad.”
In regard to certain types of limits, most Americans 
are very divided. “Some Americans think that certain 
kinds of limits (freedom of the press, the right to 
vote, etc.) are not just big costs to be bom, but costs 
of a very particular kind,” she said. “High costs that 
cause violation of rights which no citizen should 
have to bear. We differ in many ways about where we 
think that line falls between permissible, though 
disadvantageous and morally serious depravations in 
these areas, however.”
j
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As an example, she spoke of Americans differing j
opinions on the impediment currently faced by ~
Native Americans since they have been denied the
right to use peyote in their ceremonies. “Is or is this
not a violation of fundamental constitutional and
moral entitlement for these Native Americans? As
well, we differ even more intensely about whether
“There is a potential for trage 
pushed beneath the threshol( 
entitlements. Then the tragic 
For wherever we find that citi; 
beneath the threshold, social 
People incur a particular costj 
bear, the cost implicated in th
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Iimpediments to the publication of pornography are 
impossible burdens on the freedom of speech,” she 
said. “But all would agree that there is some such 
class of morally central entitlements and that violating 
these is different in kind, not just in degree, than 
depriving someone of advantage or service. They 
agree that when there is an apparent conflict between 
two public goals, where one goal seems likely to be 
sacrificed, the tragic question must be asked.”
In watching how public policy is made, it is interest­
ing to see how frequently people find themselves 
above or below what Nussbaum calls “the threshold” 
of these entitlements. “Much further work must go 
into specifying the threshold level in case of each 
entitlement and traditions of judicial interpretation 
will be involved in that process,” she noted. “There is 
a potential for tragedy to arise when citizens are 
pushed beneath the threshold on one of these basic 
entitlements. Then the tragic question comes into 
play. For wherever we find that citizens are being 
pushed beneath the threshold, social justice has not 
been done. People incur a particular cost no human 
being ought to bear, the cost implicated in the idea of 
human dignity itself.”
People are forced to chose between values involved in 
family and values involved in employment constantly, 
from asking people to work on Saturdays to manda­
tory overtime. “How can we bring it about that 
citizens don’t face tragic choices all of the time,” 
asked Professor Nussbaum. “Notice that there is
Jy to arise when citizens are 
I on one of these basic 
question comes into play.
:ens are being pushed 
justice has not been done, 
no human being ought to 
3 idea of human dignity itself.”
some connection between the obvious question and 
the tragic question when citizens try to figure out 
what an acceptable threshold level of central entitle­
ment shall be,” she added. “Asking what options 
actually are and figuring their costs and benefits 
informs a process of reflection on the tragic question 
as well, by telling us that some ways of rearranging 
things are just impossible or much, much too costly.”
As another example, Professor Nussbaum posed a 
hypotheical question: Suppose a religious group says 
they want to remove all of their children from the 
entirety of compulsory education telling us that 
because of their religion, their children can not learn 
to read and write? “Let’s suppose that we think the 
alternative of allowing them to do this is very costly, 
not only for their own children and the state’s interest 
in their education, but also for other citizens who seek 
similar exemptions possibly destroying the entire 
system of education that’s the necessary basis for 
intelligent citizenship in a pluralistic democracy,” she 
ventured. “Now, we turn back to the tragic question.
Is this one of those instances where denying them 
this alleged right is actually denying them a funda­
mental entitlement involved in the very notion of free 
exercise of religion? It seems clear that this isn’t one 
of those cases. The answer to the question — are any 
available courses morally acceptable? — is yes. It is 
acceptable to make the children go to school up to a 
certain point. We give people an acceptable level of 
liberty of religion while insisting on some education. 
We say this because we don’t think freedom of 
religion in a pluralistic democracy can feasibly be 
interpreted to demand something that will simply 
erode the foundations of civic order. And in that 
way, we draw a connection between our two ques­
tions.”
However, she warns against taking this connection 
too far. What if the administrators at her first 
university concluded that changing the time of the 
meetings would wreck the foundations of the social 
order? “Unfortunately,” she said, “that is indeed how 
people are inclined to view any ‘irritating’ changes in 
their habits. As recently as 1873 the Supreme Court 
held that to allow women to be lawyers in my home 
state of Illinois would wreck the foundations of the 
social order and go against what we call ‘the nature of 
things.’ ” According to Professor Nussbaum, know­
ing that we aren’t very reliable judges when it comes
7
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to knowing what we need for the overall survival of 
society, we should be skeptical when people tell us 
that change will “erode society.”
She said, “we should not hold certain fundamental 
entitlements hostage to current social mores.”
We should also be skeptical of the cries of those who 
say the cost of securing these “certain fundamental 
entitlements” to all citizens would be too high. “And 
we should say to them, ‘let’s try first, and see how it 
goes,’ “ she said. “After that, we should also be 
prepared to recognize if some very important social 
goods are not on/can not be on the list of entitle­
ments - it should read next to these items: ‘Are not 
available, or not available due to high costs in our 
own current social environment.’ For this would give 
us a motivation to design things better so we will be
able to secure the entitlement to people at some 
future time.”
Martha Nussbaum received her B.A. from NYU and 
her M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard. She has taught at 
Harvard, Brown, and Oxford Universities. Currently, 
she teaches both philosophy and law at the University 
of Chicago. Her publications \nc\ude Aristotle’sDe 
MotuAnimaliumOSl^, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck 
andBhics in Greek TraggdyandPhUoscphyOSBS), Love’s 
Knowiedg^OSFG), TheThettftyoflDesire(X9^,Poetic 
Justice (1996), Forijove ofCountry (1996), Cultivating 
LTumanity:AClassicalIDefenseofRrform inLiberal 
EdiMMionOSBT),SexandSocialJi4sticeOS^, Women 
arudJdurnanFTevdoprrierUQFPfS), IpheavalsoJJhought: 
TkeInteUig^nceofEniotiomO!J)X).
Quotable Quotes
“The purpose of all war is peace.” - Saint Augustine
“Peace hath her victories, no less renowned than War.” 
- John Milton
“Every gun that is made, every warship launched,
every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft
from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold
and not clothed.” - Dwight D. Eisenhower
Director’s Corner by Robert P. La wry
Tragic Questions and Moral Vigilance
T
iis issue of the Center’s Newsletter features 
a lengthy report of a speech given nearly two 
years ago at CWRU by Martha Nussbaum, 
Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University 
of Chicago. Usually such a talk, even by someone as 
illustrious as Professor Nussbaum, is considered “old 
news” after such a lapse of time. We do not con­
sider it so. Here at the CPE, what is “news” is what 
contributes to the ongoing conversation about the 
moral life. Ms. Nussbaum’s talk surely is such a con­
tribution. In it, she distinguishes between the “ob­
vious question” and the “tragic question,” the former 
being one forced upon us by the situation at hand; 
thus, requiring an answer in the form of a decision 
when events press upon us with immediacy. Lurk­
ing beneath the “obvious question,” however, and 
sometimes unseen by those in the fray, is the “tragic 
question.” That question is the one that forces the 
actor to see that whichever way the “obvious ques­
tion” is answered, some harm is bound to be done, 
some evil will directly flow from whatever decision 
is made. The burden of the “tragic question” is not 
erased by the answer given to the “obvious ques­
tion,” even if that answer is nuanced in a morally 
sensitive way. The tragedy in the hidden question 
means the actor must be willing to do something
more—give reparations, for example, when the 
waging of even a just war devastates a country 
and its largely innocent population.
The obvious question facing the United States 
government after 9-11 was how to respond to 
the horrific terrorist attach launched by al Qaeda 
upon New York and Washington? The answer 
was: wage war against both that terrorist organi­
zation and the Afghan government that was pro­
tecting al Qaeda’s operations. The tragic ques­
tion loomed within the answer to the obvious 
question: how shall we aid the country that our 
bombs devastated? For aid we must. The Afghan 
war killed innocent people and wrecked havoc on 
an already poor country. We are morally respon­
sible to help to build a decent infrastmcture in 
Afghanistan; to stabilize its internal social and 
political mayhem; and to help it to become a free 
and functioning nation.
Professor Nussbaum, however, has more to teach 
us about “tragic questions” than that there is a 
moral imperative to clean up messes we helped 
to make — even if those messes were necessary 
in pursuit of a greater good. There is more to
“The tragic question loomed within the answer to the 
obvious question: how shall we aid the country that 
our bombs devastated? For aid we must....We are 
morally responsible to help to build a decent 
infrastructure in Afghanistan; to stabilize its internal 
social and political mayhem; and to help it to become 
a free and functioning nation.” 9
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understand in tragic situations than that cost-ben­
efit analysis is an insufficient tool for moral analy­
sis. Citing Hegel, Nussbaum asks us to ask our­
selves continually: “is there a rearrangement of 
our practices that can remove tragedy?” The an­
swer is “no, not always,” for tragedy is part of the 
human condition; but the answer is also, “yes, some­
times.” When I teach professional responsibility 
to law students, I challenge them to think that the 
way they set up office practices or routinely talk to 
clients can avoid tragic questions. Do you have a 
sophisticated conflicts of interest procedure to 
avoid problems before they arise? Do you make it 
clear to clients that perjury is not something your 
law office tolerates? Can these procedures and con­
versations be themselves sensitivity established and
maintained so that stridency and personal offense 
are eliminated’
Tragic questions can occur in the routine under­
takings of life as much in the large affairs of state. 
As Nussbaum says: “...tragedy is rarely just tragedy, 
most often behind the gloom is stupidity, selfish­
ness or laziness.” The tragic question often goes 
unexamined as we deal with an obvious question. 
Sometimes, however, the tragic question can be 
avoided altogether. This takes moral vigilance, 
something ethical training can sometimes provide.
Robert P. Lawry is the Director of the 
Center for Professional Ethics and 
a Professor of Law at Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. 
His column, Director’s Corner, 
appears in each issue.
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Ethics Fellows News and Notes
TOM ANDERSON APPOINTED 
TO DEVELOPMENT POST
Ethics fellow Thomas W. Anderson has been 
appointed interim vice president for development 
and alumni relations at CWRU. Professor Anderson 
teaches ethics regularly in the EDM program at the 
Weatherhead School of Management and serves as a 
development consultant through the national firm 
Marts & Lundy.
Incidentally, Tom held this position once before, 
earlier in his CWRU career. He was featured in this 
newsletter in Volume 3, Number 1.
BETH MCGEE APPOINTED TO 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POST
1996 CWRU Ethics Fellow Beth Mcgee was ap­
pointed by Interim President James Wagner as 
affirmative action officer for faculty. The mission 
of the Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity is 
to provide support, guidance, and leadership in the 
areas of equal opportunity, affirmative action, and 
diversity; and to promote fair and equitable treat­
ment in employment and other aspects of campus 
life.
According to the CWRU’s Campus News, the creation 
of the affirmative action officer position for faculty, 
and moving this function out of the Office of the 
Provost - were recommendations of the President's 
Advisory Committee on Women.
Responsibilities in Higher Education: Experiential 
Learning as a Model for Reform” appeared in The 
Center for Professional Ethics Newsletter Volume 2, 
Number 4. She gave her paper at the Sixth National 
Communication Ethics Conference, Gull Lake, 
Michigan May 12, 2000. (with thanks to CWRU’s 
CampusNeui)
BOB LAWRYAND MEDIA
In March and April of this year, Director Robert P. 
Lawry was quoted in two major newspapers. The 
first, “Calls for Lawyers to Blow the Whistle Ethics: 
Enron’s Collapse Increases Pressure on the Legal 
Profession to Allow Lawyers to Report Clients’ 
Financial Misdeeds” was published in the Los Angeles 
Times-, and the second, “Lying for a Living When Jobs 
Are Scarce, Double Talk is Common” ran in the Fort 
Worth Star-Telegram. The first article focused on 
lawyer-client relationships in the wake of the Enron 
scandal while the second article mulled over the idea 
of lying on the job, specifically when lying about 
qualifications. You may view these articles in their 
entirety on-line at each paper’s website.
DAVID MATTHIESEN AND 
GIFTED PROGRAM
The gifted and talented students of Lakewood, Ohio 
were treated to a program presented by ethics feUow 
David Matthiesen. His program was part of a week- 
long leadership camp this spring. Matthiesen is a 
professor of materials science and engineering and 
was a member of the space shuttle Columbia team in 
the 1990s. (with thanks to the Cleveland Plain Dealer)
As readers may remember, most recently, an 
excerpt of Professor Beth McGee’s paper “ Ethical
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